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Synonyms
Ātmā; self; Self; Soul
Definition
The way ātman is predominantly understood in
Hindu spirituality is derived from the Upaniṣads.
It is an ontological principle that represents the
human “essence” at the microcosmic level, the
true and everlasting being in a living person, the
true human self, distinct from the body and iden-
tical with the cosmic principle brahman. While
the body dies and is subject to pain and pleasure,
the ātman is immortal and unaffected by pain,
pleasure, etc.
Introduction
The concept of the ātman is perhaps the crest
jewel of Hindu spiritual philosophy. This concept
occupies such an important place in Hindu theol-
ogy that being a Hindu is almost synonymous
with believing in the doctrine of the ātman. Belief
in this doctrine in fact constitutes the cornerstone
of difference between Hinduism and nāstika
schools of thought such as Buddhism or Cārvāka.
The concept of the atman as we understand it
today was articulated in the Upaniṣads. The dis-
course on the self was immortalized in the famous
dialogues between Yājñavalkya and others
(Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad), Āruṇi and Śvetaketu
(Chāndogya Upaniṣad), Prajāpati and Indra
(Chāndogya Upaniṣad), and Yama and Naciketā
(Kaṭha Upaniṣad). However, it has a prehistory in
the Saṅhitā and Brāhmaṇa portions of the Vedas.
The first section of this essay will trace that history
briefly. The second section examines the meaning
of ātman as used in theUpaniṣads, qualities of the
ātman, the locus of the ātman, the discourse on
knowing the ātman, and the issue of the brahman-
ātman identity. Subsequent to the Upaniṣads, the
six systems of Hindu philosophy each conceived
of the self in a particular way. Others, such as the
Buddhists or the Cārvākas, denied the way ātman
was defined and accepted within Hinduism. The
last section deals briefly with the position of the
six āstika schools and the Buddhists and Cārvākas
regarding the ātman.
The Pre-Upanisadic Evolution of the
Concept
It is well-known that the speculations on the
ātman began long before the Upanisadic portions
of the Vedas were composed. However, there are
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variations between the pre-Upanisadic and the
Upanisadic usage of the term. The Vedic and the
Brahmanic usages lack sharply defined contours
and are often found in a state of flux of meanings.
However, once in a while, a few sudden remarks
are also found that at least match with the direc-
tion in which the concept of ātman was to later
develop in the Upaniṣads.
According to Louis Renou, since the Ṛgveda,
the word ātman denotes “something which is at
the base of the ‘animated’ character of living
beings. . .” ([4], p. 151). In the Ṛgveda Saṃhitā,
the word ātmanvant means “animated.” It desig-
nates all beings endowed with life. It is also used
as an epithet to yakṣa to denote the “animated
mystery” that resides in the body or in the heart
of man ([4], p. 153).
From an etymological point of view, ātman is
often explained as “breath,” drawing especially
from the similarity with German terms like
“atmen,” meaning “to breathe.” However, Renou
warns against such an etymological derivation of
usage that could be deceptive. He concedes that
the “most immediately accessible use of ātman is
that one which connects the term with the wind on
the cosmic plane; the Aśvins cross the space
ātmeva vātah. . . ‘like the wind (which is the cor-
relative of) ātman’. . .” ([4], p. 151). However,
Renou is critical of equating ātman with breath
based on the later correspondence between prāṇa
and vāta. According to him, the correlation
between ātman and vāta is secondary and would
virtually disappear after the Ṛgveda Saṅhitā and
that it expressed only rough approximations that
would be substituted by concrete ideas of the
constituent elements of being. In the Atharvaveda,
not only does the correlation of ātman and wind or
breath disappear, but in fact, ātman is presented as
distinct from breath.
Another possible meaning of ātman as
“essence” is perhaps expressed when in the older
part of the Ṛgveda Saṃhitā, it is said of Varuṇa
“the wind which is thy ātman.” Later, it is also
said, for instance, of Soma that he is the ātman of
the sacrifice, thus expressing a more general con-
notation. According to Renou, in the later part of
the Ṛgveda Saṃhitā, the ātman at times represents
a kind of elementary substance and comes near to
the notion of “person.”
Renou notes new contrasts that are posited to
the ātman in the Atharvaveda, for example, with
indriya (sense organs) and especially with tanu
(body). More significantly, here ātman in the
sense of the “person” is now being distinguished
from external entities, such as “father, son, wife,”
“children” or “cattle,” “cows,” etc. New connec-
tions are also introduced, for instance, with
antarikṣa (in the Upaniṣads, this will evolve into
its connection with the more subtle ākās´a). Renou
also notes, citing Paul Deussen, that suddenly in a
verse appears “an upaniṣadic accent”: “free from
desire, wise, immortal, self-existent, satisfied with
sap, not deficient in any respect – knowing that
wise, unaging, young atman, one is not afraid of
death” ([4], p. 153).
While the Brāhmaṇas inherit these meanings,
they especially develop the use of ātman as a
reflexive pronoun. They also use the word as
meaning body. According to Renou, ātman “in
the Brāhmaṇas is not at all unitary or simple
notion. It is not the body, nor the person, nor the
soul, nor the breath, but something participating in
all these elements” ([4], p. 156).
Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa X.6.3.2 recounts the
teachings of Śāndilya: we are called to meditate
upon the ātman as, among other things, “made up
of intelligence,” “with a form of light,” “ethereal
in nature,” “swift as thought,” “this golden puruṣa
in the heart,” “greater than the sky, greater than the
earth. . .greater than all existing things.” Renou
points out that “only the identification with the
brahman is missing. . .or at the most it is implied,”
whereas this identification will be explicitly
declared in Chāndogya Upaniṣad III.14.4 where
the same teachings by Śāndilya are resumed and
amplified ([4], p. 156).
Ātman in the Upanis
˙
ads
Meaning of Ātman
In ancient India, the quest for a fundamental prin-
ciple in the universe took a turn inward – into the
inner life of human beings. In contrast to the
earlier part of the Vedas, where the focus was
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more on rituals, Upanisadic thought was predom-
inantly occupied with the idea of the self. The
great idea expressed in the Upaniṣads is that of
the identity of the fundamental cosmic principle,
brahman, and its microcosmic counterpart, ātman
(although some later schools of Hindu thought do
not accept an absolute identity between the two,
see third section below). Renou argues that while
ātman and brahman were seldom associated
together before the Upaniṣads, the discovery of
this identity between ātman and the cosmic prin-
ciple catapulted the concept of ātman to unprece-
dented heights. The correlation between brahman
and ātman is discussed in later sections of the
essay. For the time being, it may be noted that
the predominant meaning of ātman as used in the
Upaniṣads is that of an ontological principle that
represented the human “essence” at the microcos-
mic level, the true and everlasting being in a living
person, the true human self, distinct from the
body, and identical with the cosmic principle.
The distinction of the ātman from the body is
something to be noted. We already saw that in the
pre-Upanisadic literature, ātman was being used
in opposition to the body and again at times, also
as synonymous with the body. In the Upaniṣads,
ātman is understood as distinct and in some senses
the opposite of all matter, including the body. The
characteristic of matter is that it is perishable,
whereas ātman is by its very nature immortal.
Matter is insentient; ātman is of the nature of
consciousness. Body is material, and so is the
mind, in the Upanisadic framework. In fact, the
mind is referred to as subtle body. Body and mind
are subject to decay and are insentient. It is impor-
tant to note that in theUpaniṣads, mind by itself is
insentient; it can act only because of the ātman
which is consciousness behind it. The distinction
between mind and ātman is also to be noted. This,
however, should not be taken to mean that the
Upaniṣads preach about a transcendent self only.
This self which is transcendent is also immanent
in that it is the substance of which the universe is
made. More of this will be elaborated in the course
of the essay.
There is, however, another point to be noted.
One may bring up the issue of verses II.1.1-5.1
from the Taittirīya Upaniṣad where a particular
process of progressive reflection is taking place
revolving around the concept of “ātmā.” In these
verses, it is first stated that humans are the product
of the essence of food; hence, food (anna) is the
self (ātmā). Subsequently, it is said that there is
another inner self – the vital force or breath
(prāṇa). Thereafter, it is declared that there is yet
another inner self – the mind (manas). Then it is
said that right knowledge (vijn˜āna) constitutes the
self that is even interior to the mind. Finally, it is
stated that the yet inner self to vijn˜āna is bliss
(ānanda). The Upanisadic verses in question use
the word “ātmā,” meaning self, for each of these
layers of annamaya, prāṇamaya, manomaya,
vijn˜ānamaya, and ānandamaya. In his commen-
tary, Śaṃkara used the term “kos´a” instead of
“ātmā” to distinguish these layers from the
ātman, the real self. Hence, today, this idea is
popularly known as the concept of the pan˜ca kos´a.
It can be said that these verses present their teaching
in such a way that it demands the direct involvement
of a pupil in a progression of knowledge from a
proposition to a better proposition. If one is asked to
think of one’s self, one is likely to think of one’s
body (annamaya) at first, and subsequently, upon
reflection, find that there is something deeper and
subtler that appears to be the self. It is thus that one
progresses toward knowledge. Hence, it can be
argued that when Taittirīya Upaniṣad II.1.1-5.1
refer to the annamaya, prāṇamaya, manomaya,
etc., ātmās, they do not indicate the ātman but our
ordinary sense of selfhood; and the objective of
these verses is to push the seeker into a deeper
probe, pointing toward the more and more subtle.
Qualities of the Ātman
It is difficult to speak of the ātman in terms of its
qualities, because, by its very nature, it is without
attributes. However, the Upaniṣads do speak
about certain characteristics of the ātman by virtue
of which it is possible to distinguish the self from
all that is not the self, for example, the body. The
most fundamental characteristic of the ātman is its
immortality. It is neither born nor does it die; it is
unborn, constant, eternal, and primeval; it is not
killed even when the body is killed (Kaṭha
Upaniṣad II.18). It knows no old age or decay
(Chāndogya Upaniṣad VIII.1.5, Bṛhadāraṇyaka
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Upaniṣad III.5.1, Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
IV.5.15). It is everlasting because it is not the
effect of any cause; hence it is unconditioned. It
does not originate from anything (Kaṭha
Upaniṣad II.18); it is self-existent.
The ātman is pure and effulgent (Munḍaka
Upaniṣad III.1.5) and free from all evils
(Chāndogya Upaniṣad VIII.1.5). It is beyond
hunger, thirst, pain, sorrow, and delusion
(Chāndogya Upaniṣad VIII.1.5, Bṛhadāraṇyaka
Upaniṣad III.5.1, Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
IV.5.15). It is unattached and unfettered
(Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV.5.15). The self is
subtler than the subtle and greater than the great
(Kaṭha Upaniṣad II.20). It is at once smaller than
a grain of rice or barley, than a mustard seed,
millet grain, or millet kernel but larger than the
earth, the intermediate region, the sky, and all the
worlds put together (Chāndogya Upaniṣad
III.14.3). This self is omniscient and all-knowing
(Munḍaka Upaniṣad II.2.7). It is of the nature of
bliss (ānandarūpam) (Munḍaka Upaniṣad II.2.7).
The Seat of the Ātman
But where is the ātman located? It has entered into
the bodies up to the tip of the nails
(Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad I.4.7) and resides
there (Munḍaka Upaniṣad III.1.5). The ātman
within the body is homologous to a razor in a
case (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad I.4.7). Just as
fire which sustains the world is at its source,
similarly ātman is at the source of the body
(Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad I.4.7). This self is
antarataram – innermost (Bṛhadāraṇyaka
Upaniṣad I.4.8); it is within all (eṣa ta ātmā
sarvāntarah) (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad III.5.1).
However, one can say that its special place of
“hiding” is the human heart (not the physical
organ). One finds in the Upaniṣads statements
like: the ātman lies deep within one’s heart
(antarhṛdaye) (Chāndogya Upaniṣad III.14.3-4);
it lies hidden in the heart of every being (nihito
guhāyām) (Kaṭha Upaniṣad II.20). In these con-
texts, guhā (cave) in the Upaniṣads is used as
synonymous with the cave of the heart (hṛdaya).
The word guhā has the added import of depth as
well as concealment and points toward the hidden
aspect of the ātman. Why was this need to
emphasize the hidden nature of ātman? Is it then
not possible to know the ātman?
Before moving on to the issue of knowing the
ātman, one brief remark needs to be made about
the heart as the special locus of the ātman. The
ātman is not merely lodged in the cavity of the
heart, but it is also the place where it is most
suitable to perceive it. This objection may be
(and was perhaps) raised that if the ātman is
omnipresent in the body, then how could any
one place be its special locus? Śaṃkara’s Brahma
Sūtra Bhāṣya I.2.11 answers that there is no con-
tradiction between teaching about any one place
as the locus for realizing the self and the fact of its
omnipresence.
Knowing the Ātman
One of the fundamental points of investigation of
the Upanisadic seers was: What is that, knowing
which one knows all? Chāndogya Upaniṣad
VI.1.4 brings up the analogy of knowing all that
is made of clay by virtue of knowing a lump of
clay; and Chāndogya Upaniṣad VI.1.5-6 repeats
the same point by using the analogies of gold and
objects made of gold and a (iron) nail cutter and all
other iron objects. In all these verses, Uddālaka
Āruṇi’s refrain to his son Śvetaketu is that all
transformation (vikāra) is name (nāma) only; the
reality in these three cases are clay, gold, and iron
respectively. In other words, names and forms are
ever changing; but the substance is the same; it is
constant; therefore, it is the only reality (satyam).
Knowing the unchanging substance alone makes
known all the changing forms made of that
substance.
Then how to know this substance of which all
is made? The Upaniṣads immediately present a
challenge: the fact that the ātman is imperceptible
(Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV.5.15). Nobody can
see the ātman (Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad I.4.7).
When it is viewed, it is seen only in its aspects,
performing certain functions (like speaking, see-
ing, etc.); therefore, all such vision is incomplete.
It cannot be seen in its totality. Why?
The answer to this is related to the other great
question of the Upaniṣads: How to know the
Knower (vijn˜ātāramare kena vijānīyāt)? Clarify-
ing his preceding statement that after realizing the
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oneness of existence, one loses consciousness
(saṃjn˜ā), Yājñavalkya says that one smells,
sees, hears, speaks, thinks, or knows something
when there is duality, when oneness is realized
what should one smell and through what, what
should one see and through what, etc., “through
what should one know That owing to which all
this is known – through what, O Maitreyī, should
one know the Knower?” (Bṛhadāraṇyaka
Upaniṣad II.4.14). Yājñavalkya more or less
repeats this (with some additional statements) to
Maitreyī before he leaves home as a renunciate
(Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad IV.5.15).
All knowledge presupposes a split between the
subject and object of knowledge, where the
knower is the subject and the known the object.
But brahman/ātman is not an object of knowl-
edge, like a table or a chair. It is, on the contrary,
through the self that the table and the chair are
known. It is through the self that all is known
(Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad I.4.7); therefore, the
self is the eternal subject of all knowledge. And
the knower can never know himself – at least, not
in the same way as one knows a table or a chair. To
use a Vedantic analogy – it is on account of the
eyes that we see the world, but the eyes cannot see
themselves; while the fact that we see is proof that
the eyes exist! As Yājñavalkya put it to Uṣasta:
one cannot see that which is the witness of the
seeing, one cannot hear that which is the hearer of
hearing, think that which is the thinker of thought,
know that which is the knower of knowledge –
this is the self that is within all (Bṛhadāraṇyaka
Upaniṣad III.4.2).
In other words, the ātman cannot be known
through the senses, the mind, or the intellect.
The self-existent one (svayambhu) made the
senses outgoing; that is why one sees the outer
objects but not the inner self (antarātman); a
certain wise man (dhīrah) desiring immortality
turns his sight inwards and sees the self within
(Kaṭha Upaniṣad IV.1). A desireless man per-
ceives the glory of the self (Kaṭha Upaniṣad
II.20). Desires make the mind go outward, making
it chase objects in the external world; hence, on
account of desires, one fails to withdraw the mind
within, which is a precondition for the perception
of the ātman. This effulgent and pure self within
the body is attainable through the constant prac-
tice of truth, austerity, complete knowledge (about
the true nature of the self), and continence
(Munḍaka Upaniṣad III.1.5). Kaṭha Upaniṣad
II.23 adds another dimension: the self cannot be
attained through study, intellection, or hearing; it
can be known only through the self to which the
seeker prays; it is known when the self reveals it
true nature. And the result of perceiving the self is
cessation of grief – perceiving this self as bodiless
within bodies, as unchanging in the midst of the
changing, as great and all-pervading, the wise
man (dhīrah) does not grieve (Kaṭha Upaniṣad
II.22).
The unknowability of the ātman as an object is
perhaps the reason why instruction about it is
usually cryptic; it is spoken of obliquely with the
help of referents, as it cannot be objectified (as is
the case in Yājñavalkya’s dialogues in the
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad or the conversation
between Āruṇi and Śvetaketu in the Chāndogya
Upaniṣad). Moreover, the aspirant is also required
to intuit or perceive the ātman himself (as shown
in the Indra-Prajāpati episode in the Chāndogya
Upaniṣad). A precondition for this perception is
the preparation of the mind through purification.
Brahman and Ātman
The identity of the macrocosmic principle brah-
man and its microcosmic counterpart ātman is
stated in many an Upanisadic verse. For example,
Chāndogya Upaniṣad III.14.4, which amplifies
Śāndilya’s teachings as we found in Śatapatha
Brāhmaṇa X.6.3.2, states that “this ātman of
mine within the heart. . .is Brahman. . .” In
Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad III.5.1, Kahola asks
Yājñavalkya to explain that ātman within all
which is the most evident and direct brahman
(sākṣādaparokṣādbrahma). In a similar vein,
Śvetās´vatara Upaniṣad II.15 states that when
one realizes the reality of brahman as the very
reality of ātman, one becomes free from all
bondages.
Secondly, the qualities that are attributed to
ātman are the same qualities that are attributed to
brahman. For example, brahman is the ātman that
has no sin, no decrepitude, no death, no sorrow, no
hunger, and no thirst (Chāndogya Upaniṣad
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VIII.1.5). Brahman is great and self-effulgent; it is
subtler than the subtle, farther than the far-off yet
near at hand (Munḍaka Upaniṣad III. 1. 7). Brah-
man after having created (the universe) entered
into that very thing; it became the formed and the
formless, the sentient and the insentient,
etc. (Taittirīya Upaniṣad II.6.1). While it is imma-
nent, it is to be found especially within the cave of
the heart (nihitam guhāyām) (Munḍaka Upaniṣad
III. 1. 7). The brahman-ātman is the knower, the
eternal subject of all knowledge, that can never be
the object of knowledge, yet it is through this that
everything else is known. Keṇa Upaniṣad I.2
describes brahman as the ear of the ear, mind of
the mind, speech of the speech, eye of the eye,
etc., that is, brahman is that on account of which
knowledge itself is possible. Keṇa Upaniṣad I.4
cites the ancient people saying that brahman is
indeed different from the known and above the
unknown. In other words, it is neither known nor
unknown, because anything that is known is lim-
ited, on the other hand, brahman being unknown
would make knowledge itself an impossibility, as
it is through brahman that we know, brahman is
the real knower. Brahman cannot be uttered by
speech, comprehended by the mind, seen with the
eyes, and so on (Keṇa Upaniṣad I.5-9). Munḍaka
Upaniṣad III.1.8 repeats that brahman cannot be
grasped through the eyes, speech, and other
senses; the indivisible brahman can only be per-
ceived by the one, engaged in meditation, whose
mind has become pure and whose intellect is
favorable (by being transparent and tranquil,
explains Śaṃkara in his commentary).
The greatest statement of the identity of the
macrocosmic brahman and the microcosmic
ātman is perhaps “tat tvam asi” that appears as a
refrain in the sixth chapter of the Chāndogya
Upaniṣad. It is one of the Upanisadicmahāvākyas
(great sayings) and is generally accepted to mean
“you are that,” where “that” (tat) refers to pure
being or brahman. However, there is some debate
regarding it that should be mentioned. While the
Advaita “school” of Vedānta deduces absolute
identity between the two on the basis of this state-
ment, the Dvaita thinkers (see below), for
instance, question this interpretation and offer
their own alternative meanings like “you are like
that,” “you are (attached) to that,” “you are depen-
dent on that,” “you are of the nature of that,” and
so on, mainly invoking grammatical grounds ([1],
p. 109). On the other hand, modern scholars too
invoke a different interpretation on grammatical
grounds. According to Joel Brereton, for instance,
contextually as well as syntactically, it is not con-
vincing that tad stands for sat, that is, being. He
would rather translate “tat tvam asi” as “in that
way are you. . .” [1]. Patrick Olivelle agrees with
Brereton and prefers to translate “tat tvam asi” as
“that’s how you are” ([3], p. 560). On the other
hand, there are scholars who would give philo-
sophical coherence precedence over grammatical
rules (see discussion in [2], pp. 32–33, fn. 16).
While, there could be debates – mainly grammat-
ical as they appear – on the meaning of this
famous mahāvākya, the other verses cited above
show other instances where brahman-ātman iden-
tity is established, at times even quite explicitly.
Ātman According to Different Schools of
Thought
The Āstika Schools of Thought
The six schools of Hindu philosophy (dars´ana) –
Vedānta, Mīmāṃsā, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, and
Vaiśeṣika – that developed mostly after the
Upaniṣads are āstika, in that they accept the
authority of the Vedas. However, drawing from
the same source Upaniṣads, they vary in their
conceptualization of the self.
There are several schools within Vedanta, most
prominent among which are the three – Advaita
(non-dualism), Viśiṣṭādvaita (qualified non-
dualism), and Dvaita (dualism). There are several
philosophers within each of these schools, and the
history of development of the ideas of each school
is long drawn. Here we shall discuss only some
representative ideas. These three mainly differ in
their ideas about the relationship between brah-
man and the ātman. The Advaitin Śaṃkara, for
instance, explains it thus: he uses the word jīva to
denote the individual self which is a subject-
object complex. “Its subject-element is Pure Con-
sciousness and is called the Sākṣin [witness]. Its
object-element is the internal organ called the
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antahkaraṇa [the inner instrument of cognition,
consisting of manas, buddhi etc.] which is
bhautika as it is composed of all the five
elements. . .” ([5], p. 252). The former, that is,
the pure self (which is consciousness and Sākṣin)
is Brahman, and this identity is realized in
liberation.
Rāmānuja, the most prominent name in the
Viśiṣṭādvaita tradition, on the other hand, pro-
poses the philosophy of non-dualism qualified
by difference. To put it briefly, for him “Unity
means realization of being a vital member of
[the] organic whole. God or the Absolute is this
whole. He is the immanent controller...God is the
soul of nature. God is also the soul of souls. Our
souls are souls in relation to our bodies, but in
relation to God, they become His body and He is
their soul. The relation between the soul and the
body is that of inner separability. . .” ([5], p. 346).
On the other hand, Madhva, the dualist,
accepts many of Rāmānuja’s ideas, but his views
are divergent on many fundamental counts. For
him, difference is so great a fact that he advocates
five kinds of differences – that between soul and
God, between soul and soul, between soul and
matter, between God and matter, and finally,
between matter and matter. For Madhva, God is
the repository of infinitely good qualities; He is
the creator, preserver, and destroyer; He is tran-
scendent, as well as immanent as the inner con-
troller; the human soul is by nature conscious and
blissful but is subject to pain and imperfections on
account of its association with the body, sense
organs, minds, etc. Madhva accepts Rāmānuja’s
distinction between matter, soul, and God but
rejects his view that the differences between
these three have no separate existence but are
mere qualifications of identity. According to
Madhva, matter, souls, and God are three distinct
entities, and their differences constitute their
unique natures, respectively [5].
The other schools too have variations within
themselves, but here we shall consider only some
representative views. Among the Mīmāṃsakas,
Kumārila holds that “the self is of the nature of
pure consciousness and is illumined by itself”
([6], p. 236). Some scholars disagree with this
view, while some others uphold it (for details,
see [6], p. 236).
Sāṃkhya philosophy, on the other hand, rejects
the idea of a single absolute self and instead pos-
tulates the existence of a plurality of individual
souls. It postulates two co-present co-eternal
realities – puruṣa and prakṛti. Puruṣa is the soul,
the self, and the spirit; it is pure consciousness,
distinct from the body, sense organs,
etc. However, there are numerous puruṣas; as
many individuals, so many are puruṣas as their
souls or real selves. Prakṛti is the uncaused root
cause of the universe. (One may doubt if Sāṃkhya
can be regarded as consistent with the teachings
of the Upaniṣads. Despite evident differences
between the teachings of the Upaniṣads and
those of Sāṃkhya, the issue is intricate and cannot
be resolved unequivocally. See [5], p. 149, p. 31.)
According to Sāṃkhya, the self is an object of
inference and “can be inferred from its reflection
(pratibimba) in buddhi as its original (bimba)”
([6], p. 260). The perception of the self is an
impossibility, because of the split between puruṣa
and prakṛti. According to Pātañjala Yoga, how-
ever, the self can be perceived through higher
intuition, but this perception is like the pure self,
the subject, intuiting itself through its reflection,
the empirical self or the object, in buddhi.
Vaiśeṣikas like Kaṇāda hold that the pure self
can be perceived but not as an object of ordinary
perception; it cannot be perceived through the
manas. But it can be perceived by higher
intuition – a particular kind of conjunction
between the self and manas, and this conjunction
occurs as a result of a particular power (dharma)
born of meditation [6].
For the Naiyāyika, the self is a permanent sub-
stance, a substratum to qualities like cognition, plea-
sure, pain, desire, aversion, and effort. All
Naiyāyikas agree that the self is an object of infer-
ence; it can be inferred from its qualities as their
substratum. Generally speaking, the Naiyāyikas do
not believe that the self can be perceived as it cannot
be both “subject and object of the same act of
knowledge” ([6], p. 259). But some Naiyāyikas
hold that it is the object of perception as well;
however, this perception is a special kind of percep-
tion (akin to what the Vaiśeṣikas hold).
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A prominent critic of the Vedantic notion of the
self is Buddhism. They deny the existence of any
self as the āstika schools would understand
it. According to the Mādhyamika school of Bud-
dhism, the true nature of things is empty of an
intrinsic essence (s´ūnya). While the most common
approach to interpreting this s´ūnyavāda is to con-
sider it as a doctrine of void or emptiness, counter
views to this also exist. Chandradhar Sharma, for
example, holds that s´ūnya does not mean “empty
void” but “indescribable” as it is beyond the four
categories of the intellect ([5], pp. 86–87). The
Yogācāra Buddhists go one step further and say
that the self is nothing but a stream of constantly
changing consciousness lacking in any core sub-
stance. The Yogācāras, therefore, hold that the self
is but a series of cognitions, where these cogni-
tions alone are ultimately real, and there is no self
apart from these cognitions.
Sadānanda, the author of Vedāntasāra, speaks
of four kinds of Cārvākas: (1) those who identify
the self with the gross body, (2) those who identify
it with the external sense organs, (3) the ones who
identify the self with the vital force, and (4) those
who equate the self with the mind (Vedāntasāra
III.124-27). Some also identify the self with the
sons or dear ones (Vedāntasāra III.123). Jayanta
Bhaṭṭa says that the Cārvākas regard “conscious-
ness as a by-product of unconscious elements,
e.g., earth, water, fire, and air.” ([6], p. 223)
Hence, the Cārvākas do not hold the self to be an
independent, self-existent, conscious entity, as do
the Upaniṣads. Therefore, the Cārvākas believe
that the ātman as the Upaniṣads understand it
does not exist at all; it can neither be perceived
through the sense organs or the mind nor inferred
(inference is not a means of valid knowledge
according to Cārvākas; however, they find no
mark of inference either) [6].
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